Published Friday, January 11, 2013
How does Mahdism influence Iranian foreign policy?
It’s a question that requires a probing of Iranian foreign affairs and the Shia belief that, the Mahdi, or 12th Imam, will return before judgment day.To understand Iran’s foreign policy, one must consider two particulars: national interests and the religious-historical identity of society and the regime. Between the two, there is a certain level of tension that must be resolved, particularly in the Shia conception of the return of the Mahdi.
It’s a question that requires a probing of Iranian foreign affairs and the Shia belief that, the Mahdi, or 12th Imam, will return before judgment day.To understand Iran’s foreign policy, one must consider two particulars: national interests and the religious-historical identity of society and the regime. Between the two, there is a certain level of tension that must be resolved, particularly in the Shia conception of the return of the Mahdi.
When it comes to how Shia perceive their role in waiting for the
Imam, it is useful to look to the two categories of millenarian
movements defined by Eric Hosbawm: passive and revolutionary.
In discussing European millenarian movements, Hosbawm writes that
those in the latter category have “fairly definite ideas on how the old
society will be replaced by the new one,” namely through the “transfer
of power.”On the other hand, passive millenarian movements expect the
revolution to make itself through “divine revelation, by an announcement
from on high, by a miracle...”
The traditional Shia approach of ”waiting” means praying to God to
send the Imam. Once the believers accomplish their individual worship –
and when corruption and oppression fill the world – the Imam will return
and spread justice.However, the Khomeini approach is more similar to modern
revolutionary millenarian movements; the believers must strengthen their
faith individually and socially, promote Islam, and build the necessary
power to prepare for his return.
Ayatollah Mortada Motahhari, a leading figure in the Islamic
Revolution of 1979, divided these types of waiting into destructive and
constructive, both based on different views of evolution and changes in
history.
The constructive waiting views the issue of the Imam’s return as one
circle in the circles of struggle between the powers of good and evil.
Both Khomeini and Khamenei emphasized this concept repeatedly, thus
refusing the traditional approach. Khomeini once said, “We place this
revolution in the hands of the Mahdi. If God pleases, let this
revolution be the first step toward the appearance of the One Whom God
Has Preserved, and let it pave the way for his arrival.”In the era of occultation, Iran is the base from which the
believers will accomplish the necessary conditions for the return of
Mahdi.
The Islamic Republic of Iran acts as the “Medina” in the
era of Prophet Mohammad, Medina being the city that Mohammad used as a
center to build an Islamic nation. In the era of occultation, Iran is
the base from which the believers will accomplish the necessary
conditions for the return of Mahdi.Without Iran, the return of Mahdi will be delayed, therefore its
existence is a necessary condition for this return. For that, Andrew
Grotto considers Iran to be controlled by “religious hardliners
afflicted with a messianic fervor whose primary goal is not to sustain
their earthly dominion over the Iranian state, but to hasten the return
of the Mahdi.”
One main approach to the issue of how Mahdism influences Iranian
foreign policy is that of the “martyr state,” a view that grants Mahdism
a pure determinable influence over the country. If Iranian leaders
believe the Mahdi is returning soon, Matthias Küntzel argues in the New Republic they have no reason to compromise and engage in pragmatic politics.In 2009, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned that Iran
is poised to become “a messianic apocalyptic cult controlling atomic
bombs.” A similar sentiment was echoed in the words of Raymond Tanter,
president of the Washington-based Iran Policy Committee.“There is a link
between Iran’s nuclear weapons program and its ideology of trying to
facilitate a cataclysmic event to hasten the return of the Mahdi…” he
said.
However, there is another approach based on assumptions that Iran’s
ayatollahs are more “rational” than the West has allowed and that their
extreme rhetoric is due to Iran feeling threatened.Between these two extremes there is the position of the Supreme
Leader Khomeini, and then that of Khamenei, which is the formal and
dominant position.The Supreme Leader plays a balancing role by preventing deviations in
actions based on messianic views. This Khomeinism view of “waiting” is
characterized by cautiousness, avoidance of details and timing, and
denial of claims about direct personal contact with the Mahdi. As Thomas Finger once wrote, “since Iran is the world’s leading Shia
power, many Iranians expect that it will play a major role in preparing
for the Mahdi and in his subsequent activity. This belief renders
Iranian Mahdism enormously significant in global politics.”
Iranian leadership acts under the pressures of Mahdism, a role which
is sacred and whose position in Shia identity makes it deserving of high
sacrifices. Both main approaches – realism and Martyr state- are
deficient, so, Since Mahdism prioritizes certain issues in Iranian foreign policy, it does not determine all policies, but rather shapes them.
Hosam Matar is a Lebanese researcher of International Relations.
